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The supreme court next turned to Stafford's assertion that Weaver
interfered with his water rights. This allegation arose from the fact
that Weaver made changes to an irrigation lateral that provided water
to both parties' property. While the precise facts of the changes to the
lateral are complicated, Stafford basically contended Weaver
prevented him from receiving water. The court dismissed this
argument as non-meritorious because Stafford produced no evidence
of historic flow rate and because Stafford filled in the very ditch that
would have received irrigation water from the pipe Weaver installed.
Because Stafford failed to provide evidence of a prescriptive
easement or right-of-way by agreement, the supreme court affirmed
the district court's decision that Stafford trespassed and that he
demonstrated a willful disregard for Weaver's property rights by
erecting a new fence and excavating a new ditch without Weaver's
permission. In addition, the supreme court affirmed the denial of
Stafford's negligent interference with water rights claim.
M. Elizabeth Lokey
IOWA
ACCO Unlimited Corp. v. Johnston, 611 N.W.2d 506 (Iowa 2000)
(holding a city's condemnation of property owner's land did not
violate either the owner's procedural or substantive due process rights,
or his equal protection rights).
Andrew Christenson ("Christenson") owned eighteen acres in
Johnston, which he leased to ACCO Unlimited ("ACCO"), his solely
owned corporation. The land resides within a "100-year floodplain,"
an area which has a one percent chance of flooding each year. The
City ofJohnston ("City") condemned Christenson's land in an effort to
obtain federal flood relief from the Economic Development
Administration ("EDA") following a massive flood in 1993. The EDA,
as a condition to dispensing funds, required the City provide evidence
that had it either acquired the Christenson property, obtained
restrictive covenants, or rezoned it as a conservation district in order to
ensure the land would not be developed. Christenson wanted to
develop the land, and sought to have the condemnation nullified,
arguing that development could have been discouraged by means
other than condemnation.
Christenson filed suit against the City seeking a permanent
injunction and declaratory relief. A condemnation commission
awarded Christenson and ACCO damages for the taking of the land,
the amount of which was subsequently increased upon Christenson's
appeal. In the present equity action, the district court ruled in the
City's favor. The City filed a motion to dismiss Christenson's appeal of
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this action based on election-of-remedy. Christenson made three
Constitutional arguments, all of which the court rejected.
Christenson first argued the condemnation violated his procedural
due process rights because he could not have improved the land
without a floodplain development permit, which the City could have
simply denied.
Further, he argued the condemnation was a
condemnation for conservation purposes, and Iowa law expressly
prohibits conservation easements. The court rejected this procedural
due process argument reasoning that Christenson's argument assumed
the City attempted to obtain a defacto conservation easement. Rather,
the court found the City simply condemned the land for flood control
purposes.
Christenson's substantive due process argument was similar. He
argued, that instead of condemning the land, the City should have
pursued city council resolution 94-72, under which the City would
maintain the flood plain status quo by other measures, such as refusal
to extend municipal services or restricting development permits.
However, Iowa law grants cities the power of eminent domain, as long
as such action both reasonably and necessarily is for public purposes.
The court held the City condemned the property in order to maintain
the floodplain and its water storage capacity, each of which was a
reasonable and necessary public purpose.
Finally, Christenson contended the City denied him equal
protection due to the disparate treatment between his land and that of
another property located in the floodplain, which was not condemned.
Because the case involved no fundamental right, the City's action
needed only bear a rational relationship to the disparate treatment.
While both properties were similarly situated for equal protection
purposes, the owner of the non-condemned property agreed not to
develop the land, an assurance Christenson did not give. Rather,
Christenson intended to develop the property. Thus, the court
concluded the City's decision to condemn his property bore a rational
relationship to the city's interest in promoting flood control.
Adam B. Kehrli
Organic Techs. Corp. v. Iowa, 609 N.W.2d 809 (Iowa 2000) (affirming
an administrative lawjudge's finding of a compost facility's water
quality violations).
Beginning in 1992, Organic Technologies Corporation ("OTC")
operated a composting facility in Warren County, Iowa. OTC
composted yard waste and other organic waste materials. In June
1992, the Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") issued OTC a
one-year developmental sanitary permit to experiment with compost
enhancers. In May 1993, DNR issued OTC a permit for "storm water

